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BOOKS REVIEWED
A Dialogue Between A Philosopher and A Student of The Common Laws
of England. By Thomas Hobbes. Edited and with an introduction by Joseph
Cropsey. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 1971. Pp.
vii, 168. $7.50.
The famous English philosopher and political scientist, Thomas Hobbes of
Malmesbury (1588-1679), is best known to most American lawyers as the
author of Leviathan (1651), as an advocate of a monistic theory of sovereignty,
and, through Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, as an early exponent of utili-
tarianism and analytical jurisprudence. Few members of the bar have any
acquaintance with the Dialogue, a work first published by William Crooke in
1681, two years after the author's death, and not reprinted since 1840, the
date of its appearance in the collected English works of Hobbes edited by
Sir John Molesworth. Yet the generally neglected Dialogue reflects Hobbes'
mature views as a jurist or jurisprudent, if he can rightly be called such, since
he never formally studied law, taught law, practiced law, or held judicial
office. His knowledge of the laws of England, as reflected in the Dialogue,
seems to have rested upon a concentrated course of reading of the statute books
and Sir Edward Coke's Institutes, plus a smattering of the treatises of Littleton,
Bracton, Bacon, Fleta, Fitzherbert (Natura Brevium), St. Germain, Lambarde,
Staunford (Pleas of the Crown), Selden and perhaps others.'
Some uncertainties surround the genesis, composition and publication of the
Dialogue, the scheme of which probably derives from the well-known work of
St. Germain, Doctor and Student; or, Dialogues Between a Doctor of Divinity
and a Student in the Laws of England, first published in English in 1530-32.
The editor appears to accept the statement by biographer John Aubrey that in
1664, in order to stimulate Hobbes to make a study of law, he furnished the
philosopher with a copy of Sir Francis Bacon's The Elements of the Common
Laws of England, Hobbes having been a secretary or amanuensis to Bacon in
the early 1620's, and that this stimulation resulted in the writing by Hobbes
of a treatise called De Legibus which was later published as the Dialogue3
1. Probably few today would agree with J.E.G. de Montmorency that Hobbes "was a
great jurist in the deepest sense of that term," much less that he "worshipped the common
law" and that in dealing with legal material, "INo source was too obscure, no legal record
too dusty for him to use." The Great Jurists of the World. VI. Thomas Hobbes, 8 J. of
the Soc'y of Comp. Legis. (NS.) 51, 69-70 (1907). Cf. the comment of Daines Barring-
ton who refers to Hobbes' comments on the Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2
(1350), in the Dialogue and states: "It appears by this Dialogue, that this very acute
writer had considered most of the fundamental principles of the English law, and had
read Sir Edward Coke's Institutes with great care and attention." D. Barrington, Observa-
tions on the More Ancient Statutes from Magna Charta to the Twenty-First of James I,
Cap. XXVII 275 n.f (5th ed. 1796).
2. Cropsey, Introduction to T. Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student
of the Common Laws of England 5 (J. Cropsey ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Introduc-
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The editor does cautiously state that Hobbes is, "to the best of our knowledge,"
the author of the Dialogue but the fact that Crooke, Hobbes' publisher, ad-
vertised in 1675 the receipt of a manuscript by Hobbes entitled "A Dialogue
betwixt a Student in the Common Laws of Eng-land, and a Philosopher" would
seem to confirm the authorship.8 Apparently nobody else has ever laid claim
to authorship and the style is certainly characteristic of Hobbes.
Despite the 1675 announcement by Crooke, -obbes wrote Aubrey in 1679,
the year of his death, that Crooke would not get permission to publish the
Dialogue (assuming De Legibus and the Dialogue are the same work) as the
end was "imperfect."' 4 If Hobbes seriously intended to supress the Dialogue,
no charges of breach of trust were ever levelled against Crooke who in 1681
brought out the Dialogue bound in the same volume with Hobbes' The Art of
Rhetoric (the title page reads, The Art of Rhetoric, with a Discourse on the
Laws of England, reminiscent of the De Legibus designation).8 In 1681-82
Crooke also issued the Dialogue as one of a number of writings in two volumes
entitled Tracts of Thomas Hobb's.6 The abrupt ending of the Dialogue and
Hobbes' characterization of "imperfect" have led to the prevailing view, not
accepted by the editor, that the work as published was unfinished3 On the
point of suppression, it should be noted that Hobbes was sufficiently satisfied
with his manuscript to supply a copy to "his great acquaintance"8 Sir John
Vaughan, Chief Justice of Common Pleas (1668-1674), (Aubrey affirmed that
"he much admired it")0 and apparently to Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief
Justice of England, whose manuscript comments (not published until 1921)
were critical of a purely analytical and logical approach to existing laws and
political institutions.' ° Professor Cropsey makes no reference to Hale's access
to the manuscript (he died in 1676 so he saw the work in manuscript) or to
his lengthy reflections (43 pages) on "Mr. Hobbes his Dialogue of the Lawe."
The Dialogue is in the form of an extended colloquy between a speaker
called "Philosopher" and a speaker termed "Lawyer" in the text but "Student
of the Common Laws" on the title page. The editor interprets this terminological
difference as expressing Hobbes' view that members of the legal profession
were never more than students of the law; they did not make law out of any
tion]. Some biographers state that the Dialogue was written "about 1666;" when published
in 1681 Crooke described it as "'finished many years.'" J. Laird, Hobbes 35 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as Laird]. The latest act of Parliament referred to in the text is dated
1662. Introduction 2.
3. Introduction 1-4.
4. Id. at S.
5. Id. at 1.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5-8.
8. The Philosophy of Hobbes in Extracts and Notes Collated from his Writings xxx
(F. Woodbridge ed. 1903).
9. Id. at xx.
10. Hale's reflections are printed in 5 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 499-513
(3d ed. 1945). For Holdsworth's comments see id. at 482-85.
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enriched reason but merely became versed in it. To a large extent the colloquy
is a polemic directed against Sir Edward Coke who had crossed forensic swords
with Bacon during the reign of James I. The Philosopher is thus identified
with the views of both Hobbes and Bacon; the Lawyer with the views of
Coke and, in some places, with those of Hobbes." As one might expect, the
Philosopher is given the best lines and the Lawyer at times seems reduced to
the role of a "straight-man." Coke as the Lawyer undoubtedly would have
produced a more persuasive script in defense of his deeply held views on the
nature and function of the common law.
Besides Aubrey's intellectual "pump priming," what prompted Hobbes in the
mid-1660's to revive issues which had agitated legal-political circles in 1615-16
with James I, Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, Attorney General Bacon and Coke
as the chief antagonists? Coke had died in 1634, outliving Bacon by eight
years, and there is no evidence that Hobbes had participated in the earlier
controversy in any way. In fact, at the date of Coke's death, Hobbes had only
a translation of Thucydides to his credit;'12 his first important publication De
Cive, did not appear until 1642.13 Coke receives scant mention in Leviathan.14
The Dialogue devotes much space to the controversy over the relationship of
law and equity in Stuart England or, more narrowly stated, whether after a
judgment had been rendered in an action at common law, the aggrieved party
might secure an injunction in the High Court of Chancery on equitable grounds
staying entry of judgment and execution without incurring the penalties of
praemunire. The views of Coke appear in the famous King's Bench cases of
Heath v. Rydley' 5 and Courtney v. GlanvilY' The jurisdiction of the Court
of Chancery was sustained in a crushing report to James I engineered by Bacon
entitled Arguments Proving from Antiquity the Dignity, Power, and Jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Chancery.17 However, Coke in his Institutes continued to
11. Introduction 10-12. Leslie Stephen comments that in the Dialogue Hobbes' "especial
aim was to confute Coke, as the worshipper of precedent." L. Stephen, Hobbes 61 (1904).
The reader would have profited by more specific identification of the views of Bacon coupled
with references to his works.
12. Laird 34.
13. Id. at 32. The Elements of Law, Hobbes' first systematic political work, circulated in
manuscript in 1640, and in a sense, De Cive and Leviathan are revised and expanded
versions of it. See the new introduction by M.M. Goldsmith to the second edition (1969)
of The Elements of Law, Natural and Political (F. Tnnies ed. 1889).
14. Coke is mentioned by name and allusively in Chapter 26 of Leviathan--POf Civil
Laws." In some respects the Dialogue is an elaboration of this chapter.
15. 79 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1614).
16. 79 Eng. Rep. 294 (K.B. 1615).
17. 21 Eng. Rep. 576 (Ch. 1616). For an appraisal of the significance of the dispute see
Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere Disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in 1616, 36 iL L.
Rev. 127 (1941). The relevant cases and documents are printed in J. Smith, Cases and
Materials on the Development of Legal Institutions 399-414 (1965). A popular treatment
of the dispute appears in C.D. Bowen, The Lion and The Throne: The Life and T'mes of
Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) chs. 27-28 (1956). For Bacon's role in the dispute e 12
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adhere to his views as to the supremacy of the common law courts and the
question was again raised in the courts during the Interregnum and the Res-
toration.18 It is possible that the revival of the Coke-Ellesmere controversy
influenced Hobbes in his choice of subjects to be included in the Dialogue.
However, Professor Cropsey takes a broader view that the purpose of the
Dialogue was the deflation of legists, a continuation of the deflation of divines
pursued in earlier writings.'0 The deflation of clergy and legists constituted
an attempt to deprive private men of a political function that they could not
exercise without a harmful usurpation.20
Apparently no manuscript copy of the Dialogue exists and the text chosen
for editing is that of the 1681 edition. A substantial number of emendations
have been made where the text is obviously incorrect or where inaccurate
citations to sources are given. Statutes and treatises or passages therein are
identified in footnotes where necessary; some cross-references to Leviathan
are also supplied. A few obscure or confused passages are treated in discursive
footnotes. The bulk of the Introduction (48 pages) consists of a closely written
description, analysis and evaluation of the text of the Dialogue, section by
section and virtually speech by speech. The Dialogue is divided into seven sec-
tions or subjects ranging in length from eight to fifty-two pages. After a short
opening section termed "Of the Law of Reason" the argument proceeds through
the subjects of Sovereign Power, Courts, Crimes Capital, Heresie, Praemunire,
and then concludes with a lengthy section on Punishments. Unfortunately the
editor does not provide an index.
From virtually the first page of the Dialogue, Hobbes, speaking through the
Philosopher, takes issue with the views of Coke, expressed in the Institutes,
that reason was the life or soul of the law and that the laws of England rep-
resented an artificial perfection of reason achieved by long study, observation
and experience. Hobbes admitted that knowledge of the law was an art but
the art of one man or many could not be law. "It is not Wisdom, but Authority
that makes a Law."121 No one can make a law "but he that bath the Legisla-
tive Power."22 The laws of England (not limited to the statute laws) had
not been made by the professors of the law but by the Kings of England,
consulting with the nobility and commons in Parliament. This draws an ad-
mission that to the gravity and learning of the judges in making laws Coke
should have added the authority of the King in whom sovereignty resided.
Few today would regard the common law as the epitome of reason yet the
Hobbesian attack upon Coke's formulation obscures the hard fact that the
judges by their judgments and decisions did make law and that these laws
The Works of Francis Bacon 245-54, 380-99 (Spedding et al. ed. 1869) and C. Friedrich,
The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, cl. x (2d ed. 1963).
18. Crowley's Case, 36 Eng. Rep. 514, 542 n.6 (Ch. 1818).
19. Introduction 17.
20. Id.
21. T. Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and A Student of the Common Law
of England 55 (J. Cropsey, ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Dialogue].
22. Id.
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were obeyed, not because they personified judicial reasoning but because they
were made by judges sitting in Westminster Hall by virtue of letters patent
from the King.
Perhaps conscious of this "hard fact," Hobbes, in the section headed "Of
Sovereign Power," concedes that a distinction must be made between law
makers in the sense of who "devises" or "pens" laws and who makes them
effectual. With this distinction in mind the Philosopher asserts that "it is the
King that makes the Laws, whosoever Pens them."23 The Philosopher then goes
on to discuss at length the sovereign's power to levy taxes and raise troops as
a dictate of reason and seeks to compel the Lawyer to admit that "authority
is law" according to Coke's formula that "reason is Law." The Lawyer rather
woodenly reiterates word for word the passage from Coke on the artificial rea-
son of lawyers.24 This sets the stage for the Philosopher to repeat his own
depreciation of the judicial initiative in making law, reaffirming, with some
qualifications, the crucial importance of the King's reason. At this point the
reader has the definite impression that the Philosopher and the Lawyer are
talking at cross-purposes-the former having in mind acts of Parliament and
executive acts, the latter the decisional law of the kingdom.
Toward the end of the section on Sovereignty, the Lawyer grants that the
King is sole legislator and, perhaps more important, that he is sole supreme
judge; for otherwise there would be no congruity of judgments with the laws.
By the common law the King is the supreme judge over all persons and in all
causes civil and ecclesiastical. The judges of both benches held office by royal
letters patent, as did the bishops in judicial matters; the Lord Chancellor
held office by virtue of the Great Seal received from the King.2 5 This passage
is consistent with the orthodox common law view that the King was the foun-
tain-head of all justice although Coke probably would not have made the
concession in haec verba.
This concession as to judicial supremacy leads into the two principal themes
of the next section, "Of Courts," that (1) the King was supreme judge and
that (2) the court of equity, the High Court of Chancery, was the supreme
court of the realm. Hobbes rejects the common law view, based largely upon
custom and adopted by Coke, that would favor King's Bench as a "supreme
court of review." The Philosopher is made to demonstrate that from the stand-
points of history and reason the High Court of Chancery has the best claim
to be the ultimate court of revision. This involves a showing (1) that the
statutes contrary to this claim have been misconstrued by Coke or are in a
state of confusion, (2) that the King by appointing judges did not alienate
his judicial supremacy, and (3) that the customary jurisdictional privileges or
claims of certain courts could not limit the royal prerogative of judicial ap-
pointment. The argument is climaxed by the proposition that "there was a
23. Id. at 59.
24. Id. at 61-62. In connection with this see Sir Edward Coke (1552-1633): His Theory
of "Artificial Reason" as a Context for Modem Basic Legal Theory, 84 L.Q.R. 330 (1968).
25. Dialogue 68.
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necessity of a Higher Court of Equity, than the Courts of Common-Law, to
remedy the Errors in Judgment given by the Justices of Inferior Courts."2"
In reading this section of the Dialogue one has the haunting fear that Hobbes
did not fully grasp the relation of law and equity in the English law, despite
his crash program of legal education and despite the airing of opposing views
in the controversy of 1615-16. Brushing aside the argument that it would be
unlawful to remove a cause from one court to another if this resulted in a
change in the method of trial (by a judge instead of a jury), Hobbes fiercely
denounced resort to custom to determine the powers or jurisdiction of any
court:
I deny that any Custome of its own Nature, can amount to the Authority of a Law:
For if the Custom be unreasonable, you must with all other Lawyers confess that it is
no Law, but ought to be abolished; and if the Custom be reasonable, it is not the
Custom, but the Equity that makes it Law. 27
The section closes on a note of unreality as Hobbes proposes (1) that stat-
utory language itself be subject to review in a court of equity to prevent the
literal reading of statutory provisions from interfering with legislative intent
and (2) that bishops ought to be appointed chancellors as being commonly
the most able and rational men. Needless to say, the Lawyer recoils from the
last uncharacteristic proposal.
What qualities in the opinion of Hobbes would make a good judge? A passage
in Leviathan provides the answer:
The things that make a good judge or good interpreter of the laws are, first, a right
understanding of that principal law of nature called equity, which, depending not on
the reading of other men's writings but on the goodness of a man's own natural reason
and meditation, is presumed to be in those most that have had most leisure and bad the
most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, contempt of unnecessary riches and
preferments. Thirdly, to be able in judgment to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred,
love, and compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, patience to hear; diligent attention in hear-
ing; and memory to retain, digest, and apply what he has heard.2"
What of the role of lawyer as opposed to the judges? In one colloquy in
the Dialogue the Lawyer gives six reasons, taken from the Institutes, for the
increased volume of suits in the King's courts, one being the multitude of
attorneys. After remarking that Coke had no mind to attribute any fault to his
own profession, the Philosopher or Hobbes proceeds to the following strictures:
And lastly for the multitude of Attorneys, it is the fault of them that have the power
to admit, or refuse them. For my part I believe that Men at this day have better
learn't the Art of Caviling against the words of a Statute, than heretofore they had,
and thereby encourage themselves, and others, to undertake Suits upon little reason.
26. Id. at 94-95.
27. Id. at 96.
28. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 26, at 223 (H.V. Schneider ed. 1958). Compare this with
Bacon's famous essay "On Judicature" as to which Sabine commented: "The essay seems
to be full of oblique references to Coke, whom Bacon doubtless regarded as the type of a
bad judge." G. Sabine, A History of Political Thought 451 (3d ed. 1961).
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Also the variety and repugnancy of Judgments of Common-Law do oftentimes put Men
to hope for Victory in causes, whereof in reason they had no ground at all. Also the
ignorance of what is Equity in their own causes, which Equity not one Man in a
thousand ever Studied, and the Lawyers themselves seek not for their Judgments in
their own Breasts, but in the precedents of former judges, as the Antient Judges sought
the same, not in their own Reason, but in the Laws of the Empire. Another, and perhaps
the greatest cause of multitude of Suits is this, that for want of Registring of con-
veyances of Land, which might easily be done in the Townships where the Lands ly, a
Purchase cannot easily be had, which will not be litigious. Lastly, I believe the Cove-
teousness of Lawyers was not so great in Antient time, which was full of trouble, as
[it has] been since in time of Peace, wherein Men have leisure to study fraud, and get
employment from such Men as can encourage to Contention. And how ample a Field
they have to exercise this Mystery in is manifest from this, that they have a power to
Scan and Construe every word in a Statute, Charter, Feofment, Lease, or other Deed,
Evidence, or Testimony.29
The sixth section, "Of Praemunire," while ostensibly a discussion of offenses
not capital (it follows sections on capital crimes and heresy), is actually a
continuation of the section "(On Courts." This short section is largely an as-
sault upon the construction placed by Coke upon the Statute of Praemunire,
27 Edward 3, c. 1 (1353) to the effect that the High Court of Chancery,
among other courts within the realm which proceeded "by the rule of another
law" or drew the party ad aliud examen, was prohibited from defeating or
impeaching judgments given in the common law courts. Actually this is a
rather truncated version of the 1615-16 controversy omitting all reference to
Statute 4 Henry 4, c. 23 (1425) (Statute of Simple Prohibition), of equal
importance to Coke's argument, Heath v. Rydey,30 Courtney v. Glanvil3 ' and
the certification of practice by Bacon and the King's counsel.32 To Hobbes,
resort to the Court of Chancery for relief on equitable grounds against a
judgment at common law could not be praemunire since it tended neither to
the disherison of the King or of the people, nor to the subversion of the law
of reason, i.e., the common law, nor to the subversion of justice nor to any
harm to the realm.
The fourth section of the Dialogue, "Of Crimes Capital," is in the nature
of a review of the irrationalities and inanities of English criminal law with
respect to treason and felonies, spiced with frequent criticism of Coke's views
as set forth in the Institutes. As to a denial by Coke that a traitor is in legal
understanding the King's enemy, the Philosopher remarks: "This is not an
Argument worthy of the meanest Lawyer." 33 Apart from downgrading the
common law and Coke it is difficult to see how the section advances the basic
argument of the Dialogue. The fifth section, "Of Heresie," is a digression on
the irrationality of imposing punishment, really capital punishment, for the
29. Dialogue 83-84 (footnote omitted).
30. 79 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1614).
31. 79 Eng. Rep. 294 (K.B. 1615).
32. J. Smith, Cases and Materials on the Development of Legal Institutions 403 (196S).
33. Dialogue 105.
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holding of a doctrine or belief as such. Coke's treatment of the offense is again
the basis of the criticisms levelled. The seventh or last section, "Of Punish-
ments," makes the point that there is no natural or rational connection between
the offense and the punishment; punishments in English law are excessively
harsh and irrationally vengeful. Taking the passage in the Dialogue that "the
Punishing of Offences can be determined by none but by the King, and that,
if it extend to life or member, with the Assent of Parliament, '3 4 Professor
Cropsey remarks:
Hobbes is in the position of a Parliamentarist modifying the punitive prerogatives of
the monarch by appearing to reassert the sole sovereignty of the monarch against the
encroachments of that Parliamentary activist, Sir Edward Coke. Why he should have
undertaken a polemic against Coke thus becomes clearer: Coke's doctrine, and there-
with the common law, was menacing to the civil order in England in visibly depreciating
the prerogative while weakening the crown additionally through making the legal
system unreasonably vengeful, and to that extent odious and unendurable.0 6
The next subject is pardoning, with the Philosopher's thought that Coke
and the common law, in their punitive state, would restrict the King's power
of pardoning at every possible point.
The Dialogue doses with an abrupt transition to a discussion of the laws of
property, giving rise to the doubts as to whether the work was left unfinished.
What interest has the Dialogue for today's reader? Hobbes, Coke and Bacon
are still central figures in the fields of legal history, jurisprudence and political
science. While the subject of praemunire may be confined in interest to aca-
demics,3 6 the broader subject of the relation of law and equity still attracts
the attention of practitioners and students of the law. From the standpoint of
jurisprudence the book is a striking example of the clash of the historical and
analytical schools. For political scientists interested in concepts of sovereignty
the work supplements Leviathan and is of particular interest in the role as-
cribed to Parliament. Those interested in the history of law reform may even
find in Hobbes the seeds of later changes such as the fusion of law and equity,
registration of titles to land and a systematic penal code.
7
JOSEPH H. SMITH*
34. Id. at 140.
35. Introduction 41. See also M. Cattaneo, Hobbes's Theory of Punishment, Hobbes
Studies 275 (K.C. Brown ed. 1965).
36. A Doctoral Dissertation in progress at Loyola University of Chicago by J. Dennis
Lamping is tentatively entitled "Sir Edward Coke: His Interpretation of 'In Other Courts."'
See also E.B. Graves, "Studies on the Statute of Praemunire of 1353," Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation, Harvard University, 1928; E.B. Graves, The Legal Significance of the Statute
of Praemunire of 1353, in Anniversary Essays in Medieval History by Students of Charles
Homer Haskins 57 (1929).
37. See H. Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Institutions 397-98 (7th ed. 1914).
* George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History, Columbia University School of
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Medical Jurisprudence. By Jon R. Waltz and Fred E. Inbau. New York: Mac-
millan Co. 1971. Pp. xiv, 398. $10.95.
Law studies are reportedly on the rise in medical schools. Eleven medical
schools in the United States have separate divisions of legal medicine, and
approximately 42 offer courses which range from short lecture series to seminars.
Of the 42 schools, 27 offer the course as an elective, while 15 make it a require-
ment.'
Medical Jurisprudence by Professors Jon Waltz and Fred Inbau is a sound
contribution to the development of the study of legal medicine, and will un-
doubtedly be used by students in many of these programs. Its intended audience
is primarily the student and practitioner of medicine, not the lawyer. Since
medical malpractice and courtroom testimony are frequent concerns of the
medical student, the subjects most commonly covered in legal medicine courses
in medical schools are professional liability, problems relating to patient's consent
to diagnostic, therapeutic, and investigational procedures, and medical testimony
in court. Of the various topics, the subject of medical malpractice is, not sur-
prisingly, closest to the physician's heart, for it involves his reputation and his
pocketbook. Medical malpractice suits have substantially increased in the past
decades and continue to grow both in number and in the dollar amount of the
claims.2 Medical Jurisprudence is aimed primarily at this interest. With the
exception of 38 pages covering the physician and the criminal law, and 8 pages
covering the physician as a courtroom witness, this text is devoted to an analysis
of medical malpractice.
In Part I of the book, "The Physician and the Civil Law,"3 the physician is
introduced to the litigation process, laws concerning licensing, and the private
canons of professional and inter-professional conduct. Of particular importance
to the modem physician is the authors' treatment of medical malpractice liability
insurance.4 Part II, "The Physician and the Criminal Law,"15 contains a discus-
sion of medical questions which frequently arise in criminal litigation, such as
the estimation of time of death and the interval between injury and death. The
criminal laws pertaining to abortion, homicide, and the failure to report criminally
inflicted injuries and the habitual use of narcotic drugs are also touched upon
briefly. Part III, "The Physician in Court,"0 describes what is required of a
physician as a courtroom witness.
1. Beresford, The Teaching of Legal Medicine in fedical Schools in the United States,
46 J. Med. Ed. 401, 401-02 (1971).
2. J. Waltz & F. Inbau, Medical Jurisprudence 38-40 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Waltz & Inbaul; Halberstam, The Doctor's New Dilernma--" Wfll I Be Sued?," N.Y. Tines,
Feb. 14, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 8.
3. Waltz & Inbau 3-326.
4. Id. at 302-08. See also Franklin, What Should Be in a Malpractice Insurance Policy,
14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 478 (1965); Mlrsch, Insuring Against fedical Professional Liability,
12 Vand. L. Rev. 667 (1959); Uhthoff, Medical Malpractice-The Insurance Scene, 43 SL
John's L. Rev. 578 (1969).
5. Waltz & Inbau 329-66.
6. Id. at 369-76.
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Although the range of topics is broad, this book is essentially a discussion of
the principles of the law of torts and evidence in a medical context. As would be
expected of such a textbook, it is essentially expository rather than argumentative
in approach. While the title, "Medical Jurisprudence," is ambitious, one would
not expect when seeing its relatively small size-398 pages set in large type--
that it would cover all points of contact between law and medicine. It does not.
The authors fail to include current topics of interest, such as legal regulation
and liability of hospitals and health facilities, the activities of the physician in
adoption, artificial insemination, contraception, sterilization, sex-change surgery,
overtreatment and undertreatment, suicide prevention, and public health.
The need for a book which thoroughly analyzes the law as it relates to medical
developments is apparent. With the discarding of charitable and governmental
immunity, the question of hospital liability takes on new meaning for the
physician. Formerly a hospital was little more than a housekeeping facility, a
place where the patient was bedded and fed. Today only minor procedures are
carried on in the physician's office. The physician has grown increasingly depen-
dent on the hospital's technicians and facilities. The hospital is becoming the
"community health center" or as is sometimes said, "the doctor's workshop."
The modem hospital is a vast, complex operation, and it is increasingly diffi-
cult for people who work there to fully understand and appreciate the duties
and responsibilities of their colleagues. At one time hospitals argued that they
had no control over the physician. Today the law recognizes a duty to supervise.7
While insurance covering all members of the health team diminishes the impor-
tance of these problems, legal and administrative issues remain. The issue of
respondeat superior is complex. In the case of a nurse's negligence, some courts
take the position that even though a nurse is acting under a physician's order,
responsibility under respondeat superior falls upon the hospital as well as the
physician since nurses have a duty to report to the hospital administration.8 In
the case of an anesthesiologist's negligence, the question arises whether the
physician or the hospital decides upon the anesthesiologist or the use of anes-
thesia.9 In the usual case, the hospital denies control and the physician says that
he has little control and less choice. Under the traditional view, now in dispute,
the surgeon is said to be "captain of the ship." 0
The emergency room provides a wide area of litigation. Even a private hospital
may be held liable for refusing to care for an individual in an emergency situa-
7. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). "Just where the courts will draw the line on
the extension of joint and several liability imposed on the private physician and the hospital
is difficult to predict at this point." Ludlam, Physician-Hospital Relations: The Role of Staff
Privileges, 35 Law & Contemp. Prob. 879, 884 (1970).
8. Monk v. Doctors Hosp., 403 F.2d 580, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Stone v. Sisters of Charity,
2 Wash. App. 607, 610, 469 P.2d 229, 231 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970); see Waltz & Inbau 105.
9. See Waltz & Inbau 105. See generally Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915
(1955).
10. E.g., Honeywell v. Rogers, 251 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa. 1966); Collins v. Hand,
431 Pa. 378, 246 A.2d 398 (1968) ; see Waltz & Inbau 114-16.
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dion.11 Moreover, the role of the emergency room in health care is taking on
added significance in view of the growing inaccessibility of the private practi-
tioner. An emergency room may be operated by a "professional organization of
physicians," but the independent contractor defense may not stand up. Fre-
quently emergency rooms are understaffed and lack modem facilities.'-
The authors' discussion of emergency treatment is limited to the old bugaboos
frightening the good samaritan. Fear of a malpractice suit for care in emer-
gencies amounts to what Professor Plant calls a '"legal spook? "1 Although
there has not been a single discoverable suit adjudicated against any person
involved in a "good samaritan" act, many states have passed such laws in
response to pressure from medical organizations.
Although the number of malpractice suits are on the increase, one may wonder
about the physician's concern. The physician may be sued, but he is a party in
name only: the real defendant is the insurer, at whose expense the physician
ought to be only too happy to see his patient compensated. The settlement or
judgment is not out of his pocket (although the premiums are), and his practice
is hurt not one whit from a malpractice suit. The malpractice suit may be a
blow to self-esteem, but little else. Physicians and particularly specialists seem
to be immune from the effects or stigma of a malpractice suit because their
services are in short supply.
It is also interesting to note that notwithstanding the publicity surrounding
medical malpractice suits, there is apparently no follow-up of the cases by medical
associations. Members are rarely disciplined. When asked who has made the
greatest contribution to the practice of medicine, one wit answered, "Melvin
Beli, the California lawyer." Self-policing within the profession has not substan-
tially improved since the day Hippocrates observed, "There is no punishment
for the malpractice of medicine."
The number of malpractice suits, although increasing, has been given all too
extensive publicity.' 4 Insurance companies do not complain; playing on the
physician's fears makes it easier to ask higher premiums. While beclouded by
publicity, the fact remains that the malpractice case constitutes a small part of
the lawyer's work. Indeed many lawyers refuse to handle a negligence case
against a physician. The lawyer seeks the friendship of the medical community;
he needs the physician as an expert witness in personal injury and workmen's
compensation cases, which constitute some 70 percent of all trial practice. The
11. E.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); O'Neill v.
Montefiore Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Ist Dep't 1960). Contra,
Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934). See generally
Powers, Hospital Emergency Service and the Open Door, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1455 (1968).
12. "Most hospitals have emergency rooms. Too many of them are staffed by a nurse
who is elsewhere in the hospital when a patient arrives in shock, or by a doctor who is
'on call' Translated that often means 'at home.'" Life, Nov. 6, 1970, at 26. See also
Vall St. J., Oct. 5, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
13. Hospital Physician, July 1966, at 11.
14. See, e.g., Bradbury, The Doctor Has a Bad Day in Court, Life, Sept. 13, 1968, at 75;
Halberstam, supra note 2; Medical World News, Oct. 24, 1969, at 34.
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lawyer does not wish to jeopardize this work by an occasional malpractice case.
Among the physicians sued, anesthesiologists, orthopedists and surgeons head
the list. The rapport between them and their patients tends to be thin, and their
errors tend to be obvious. At the other end of the spectrum is the psychiatrist,
who is rarely if ever sued for malpractice in psychotherapy.
The exhaustive report of Senator Abraham Ribicoff's committee investigating
medical malpractice concludes that to a large extent, malpractice suits are the
indirect result of the breakdown of the traditional patient-physician relationship.
The main cause for poor medical care today is the pressure of heavy case loads;
the physician in the United States is usually well trained. Standard of care is
measured by the circumstances, and the circumstances include the fact that the
physician has a heavy case load. The physician is not held responsible in tort
for his complicity in keeping down the supply of available physicians.10 Despite
America's wealth, medical care in this country is poor for the great mass of
people. It costs more while providing less satisfaction and poorer treatment for
millions.17
Another issue blown out of proportion in medico-legal discussions is that of
consent to treatment. The authors devote 27 pages to it.18 In medical practice,
consent is perfunctorily given. The instinct for survival compels a person to sign
almost any kind of consent form put before him. However, it is not so much the
threat of a tort suit that dissuades the physician from treating a person without
his consent. There are other considerations. Without the patient's consent, the
physician is not likely to get paid. Moreover, confronted with a heavy case load,
the physician has a ready excuse to avoid treating an untoward patient even
when faced by appeals of family members.
Another of the long discussions in the book is devoted to the "locality rule,"19
namely, that "a medical man has the obligation to his patient to possess and
employ such reasonable skill and care as are commonly had and exercised by
reputable, average physicians in the same general system or school of practice
in the same or similar locality."'20 The locality rule made it well-nigh impossible
to prove a case of negligence. If the standard of care is standard in the locality,
then the physician from that locality is needed as a witness, but it is difficult
to obtain a physician from the same locality to testify against a colleague. The
15. Staff of the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Gov't,
Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Study on Medical Malpractice: The Patient Versus the
Physician 1 (Comm. Print 1969).
16. Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 Law & Contemp. Prob. 267
(1970).
17. S. Greenberg, The Quality of Mercy (1971). See also Lewis, Physician, Heal Thyself,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1971, at 31, col. 1; id., Oct. 4, 1971, at 39, col. 1.
18. Waltz & Inbau 152-77.
19. Id. at 64-74.
20. Id. at 64 (footnote omitted) (emphasis deleted). See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts
§ 32, at 164 (4th ed. 1971); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand.
L. Rev. 549 (1959).
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rule, first incorporated into the standard of care some 90 years ago in a Massa-
chusetts case,21 has been relaxed through the years by various devices.
One needs little boldness to predict the demise of the locality rule. While it
may linger a bit longer as to the general practitioner, the standard for the
specialist is generally held to be the same as that of other specialists within the
field, regardless of where or the type of community in which they practice.-
Several reasons account for the demise of the rule. A geographical concept
is inappropriate when people move about as frequently as they do in this country.
Many physicians have attended schools outside the locality where they ultimately
practice. The requirements for board certification of specialists are nation-wide
requirements. Physicians not only read national publications but are increasingly
attending national conferences. In short, the "locality" is now the entire country.
The authors' discussion on forensic investigation and pathology is innovative
in a medico-legal course textbook. In some countries a course in forensic medicine
in law or medical school is devoted almost entirely to medical-legal investigation;
it has been ignored in United States schools. The assassination of President
Kennedy, the killing of civil rights workers in Mississippi, and the Attica prison
riot have forcefully pointed out the need for a kind of "medical ombudsman"
who can be relied upon for a competent, impartial medical examination. The
need for documentation of external wounds prior to any alteration by therapeutic
endeavors arose in the case of the assassination of President Kennedy. As the
authors tell us, if proper notation had been made of the exit bullet wound in the
front of the President's neck prior to the tracheostomy incision, much subsequent
confusion would have been avoided regarding the course of the bullet.3 The
report on the deaths at Attica by medical examiner John F. Edland cut through
the confusion and distortion that had prevailed. -2 4
Since this book purports to be a scholarly work, one is surprised by its cook-
book ending, consisting of some do's and don'ts that "may serve the purpose of
rendering a physician's courtroom experience less unpleasant than originally
anticipated" and "will also enhance the effectiveness of his testimony. -5 The
suggestions include: be prepared; confer with the lawyer calling you as a witness;
do not be nervous or frightened; be courteous; do not be patronizing or smug;
avoid esoteric terminology; tell the truth, no more or no less; maintain com-
posure; do not answer a question to which objection has been made until the
judge has announced his ruling; do not volunteer information from the witness
stand. Judging from these suggestions, one would think that here the authors
might well have heeded their own advice to speak no more than is necessary.
21. Small v. Howard, 128 Aass. 131 (1880), overrled, 354 ass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793
(1968).
22. E.g., Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Naccarato v. Grob,
384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970); Silberstein v. Berwald, 460 S.W.2d 707 (Mo. 1970).
Contra, Campbell v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 207 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Sims v. Silvey,
246 So. 2d 394 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
23. Waltz & Inbau 330.
24. Newsweek, Oct. 11, 1971, at 67.
25. Waltz & Inbau 373.
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Except for the ending, however, this book gives a splendid overview of many
aspects of legal medicine. Students of medicine as well as law are fortunate in
having it available.
RALPH SLOVENXO*
* Professor of Law and Psychiatry, Wayne State University School of Law.
